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 There is considerable variation in the hours worked and in the
reported devotion to work of persons among advanced Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.  Ameri-
cans, the Japanese, Australians, and New Zealanders put in lots of
hours on the job.  Relatively many Americans and Canadians report
that they want to work more hours than they do.  By contrast, western
Europeans enjoy long vacations and considerable leisure while
employed, and in many European Union countries work sharing is
encouraged as a method for dealing with unemployment.  During the
1980s and 1990s the gap between time worked by employed Ameri-
cans and Canadians and time worked by their western European com-
rades increased noticeably.
There is also considerable divergence in earnings inequality among
advanced OECD countries, with inequality higher in the United States,
Canada, and the United Kingdom than in most OECD-Europe coun-
tries.  During the 1980s and 1990s, moreover, inequality also grew
much more rapidly in the United States, the United Kingdom, and to a
lesser extent Canada than in continental western European countries
(Freeman and Katz 1994).
To what extent, if at all, are these two patterns related?  Does high
earnings inequality induce workers to work longer hours and work
harder?  Has increased inequality contributed to the rising gap in time
worked between workers in the United States and Canada and those in
Europe?  How does the greater work time of Americans affect compar-
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isons of economic performance between the United States and other
OECD countries?
This chapter presents the basic facts about “working hard” in the
United States and Canada relative to other advanced OECD countries.
It sketches out the hypothesis that inequality in outcomes increases
work activity and offers some preliminary evidence from the United
States regarding this hypothesis.  The empirical evidence reveals a pos-
itive relationship between the hours worked within detailed occupa-
tion, industry, and region cells, and the inequality in hourly wages in
those cells is consistent with the hours-inequality hypothesis.
NORTH AMERICANS AS WORKAHOLICS
Hours Worked and Preferences
Table 1 presents estimates of annual hours worked and changes in
annual hours worked in major advanced OECD countries.  Column 1
records annual hours worked per employed person as reported by the
OECD.  The sample of employees includes part-time as well as full-
time workers.  Annual hours are higher in the United States than in the
major European countries, although workers put in many hours in sev-
eral other countries as well, most notably Japan, Australia, New
Zealand, and Finland.  Hours worked by employed Canadians are 3
percent lower than hours worked by employed Americans, but they are
still above the hours worked in most advanced OECD-European coun-
tries.  Annual hours per employed person does not, however, capture
the full difference in working time among countries because there are
also sizable differences in the ratio of employees to the adult popula-
tion, due in part to labor force participation decisions and in part to dif-
ferences in rates of unemployment across countries.  In 1994, for
example, the employment/population ratio for 16–64 year olds was
73.2 in the United States, 64.2 in Canada, and 58.2 in OECD-Europe
(OECD 1995).  Column 2 of Table 1 records employee/population
ratios for the various countries for which we have annual hours data.
Multiplying the annual hours per employed person by the employment/
population ratios gives the annual hours worked per person of working
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United States 1,780 73.2 1,303 –121.5
Canada 1,719b 63.8 1,097 –148.5
United
Kingdom 1,717b 66.5 1,142 –120.8
Norway 1,415 72.7 1,029 –346.0
Sweden 1,544 70.3 1,085 –65.9
Germany 1,578 62.6 988 –389.0
Finland 1,780 60.1 1,070 –204.0
France 1,631 59.0 962 –320.4
Netherlands 1,395 63.7 889 –361.3
Australia 1,882 67.0 1,261 —c
New Zealand 1,843 68.2 1,257 —
Japan 1,965d 74.2 1,458 –236.0e
SOURCE: Column 1, OECD (1995, Table C); column 2, OECD (1995, Table A); col-
umn 4, calculated from OECD (1996, Table 3).
a Based on estimates of annual average change in hours from trough to trough over
three time periods, as given in OECD Employment Outlook, 1996.  Exact time peri-
ods by country as follows: 1) United States, 1970–71; 2) Canada, 1970–92; 3) United
Kingdom, 1971–93; 4) Norway, 1970–92; 5) Sweden, 1972–93; 6) Germany, 1971–
94; 7) Finland, 1971–93; 8) France, 1971–93; 9) Netherlands, 1972–93.
b 1993 data.
c A dash implies that data for these countries were not provided in the OECD table.
d 1992 data.
e Based on change in actual hours per employee (1973–93), as reported in OECD
Labor Force Statistics.
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age in column 3.  The differences between the United States and west-
ern Europe in hours worked per adult are on the order of 30 percent,
whereas those between Canada and western Europe are relatively mod-
est.  To the extent that hours worked per adult are a measure of “work-
ing hard,” Americans work harder than Canadians and western
Europeans.
There are two additional pieces of evidence that support the claim
that Americans are more devoted to work than are western Europeans.
In its 1989 World of Work module, the International Social Science Pro-
gramme (ISSP) survey1 of workers in different countries contained the
following question: Which of the following statements best describes
your feeling about your job? 1) I work only as hard as I have to, 2) I
work hard but not so much that it interferes with the rest of my life, 3) I
make a point of doing the best work I can, even if it interferes with the
rest of my life.  Figure 1 compares the proportion of workers who gave
Figure 1 Percentage of Workers Who Work Hard
“Even if It Interferes with the Rest of Their Life”
SOURCE: Bell and Freeman (1995, Table 5.7).
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the third response—working hard even if it interfered with their lives—
among the advanced OECD countries covered by the 1989 survey.  The
figure shows that U.S. workers were the most likely to work hard at the
expense of the quality of their lives, followed by persons in other
English-speaking countries.  Germans, Norwegians, and Austrians, on
the other hand, were the least likely to sacrifice for their jobs.
The second piece of evidence comes from surveys that ask individ-
uals to choose between working more or fewer hours than they cur-
rently do.  These questions are a bit tricky, because by specifying the
hypothetical differently, one can readily induce different but valid
responses.  We focus on questions that ask people about the desire to
work fewer or more hours at the same rate of pay, as opposed to ques-
tions that ask about the desire to work more hours at an overtime rate
or about preferences between increases in pay for the same hours of
work versus the same pay for reductions in hours worked.2
For the United States, data on preferences come from the May
1985 Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplement.  The specific
question analyzed is: If you had a choice would you prefer to work: 1)
the same number of hours and earn the same money, 2) fewer hours at
the same rate of pay and earn less money, or 3) more hours at the same
rate of pay and earn more money?  For Canada, the June 1985 Cana-
dian Labour Force Survey asked a more detailed and complicated ques-
tion that also specified that the employees would be paid the same rate,
while at the same time indicating that all other conditions of work
remained the same (see Kahn and Lang 1988).  For European coun-
tries, the March 1991 European Economy reports results from a Euro-
pean Economic Community (1991) survey that asked the question this
way: Assuming that your present hourly rate remained unchanged,
would you like to work less, as long, or longer?  For Japan, the 1992
Employment Status Survey (Shugyo Kozo Kihon Chosa) asked a ques-
tion comparable to the May 1985 CPS question.
Table 2 summarizes the results from these diverse surveys.  It
shows a striking difference in preferences for more or less work
between Americans and Canadians and western Europeans, and
between Americans and Canadians and the Japanese as well.  While in
all countries the majority of people are satisfied with their current
hours at work, the proportion wanting to work more hours than they
currently do is higher for Canadians and Americans than for Europeans
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or Japanese, and the proportion who want to work fewer hours is lower
for Americans and Canadians than for Europeans and Japanese.  The
differences in preferences among countries are well-summarized by
the final column of Table 2, which shows the differences among coun-
tries between the proportions of individuals wanting more and less
work.  The fact that North Americans work more hours than Europeans
and at the same time have a greater preference for additional hours
worked than Europeans is particularly noteworthy.  By contrast, the
Japanese, who also work many hours, want to work fewer hours than
they currently do and, in preferences if not actual hours worked, more
closely resemble the Europeans.3
In sum, on the basis of all three statistics—hours worked, willing-
ness to sacrifice for work, and desire to work more—Americans appear
to be working harder than Europeans.  As in many other statistics, Can-
ada falls somewhere between the United States and Europe, showing
high preferences for additional hours of work in surveys of preferences
but not actually working all that much more than Europeans.















Canada (1985) 35 50 15 20
United States (1985) 27 65 8 19
Japan (1992) 3 68 30 –27
Germany (1989) 4 55 38 –34
United Kingdom (1989) 4 65 30 –26
Europe 9 51 37 –28
SOURCE: Canada—tabulated from data in Kahn and Lang (1988).
United States–May 1985 Current Population Survey, as reported in Bell and Freeman
(1995).
Germany– European Economic Community (1991, Table 2).
United Kingdom–British Social Attitudes Survey.
Europe–European Economic Community (1991, Table 22). Data include Belgium,
Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.  In the E.U. study,
U.K. figures are 12 percent for more hours/earnings, 50 percent for the same, and 12
percent for less, giving a  difference of –21.
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Changes in Hours over Time
Has the hours difference between North Americans and western
Europeans always existed, or is this a relatively recent phenomenon?
The evidence in column 4 of Table 1 shows that the greater work activ-
ity by North Americans developed in the 1970s–1980s.  According to
the OECD estimates, in 1970 (adding column 4 to column 1),  North
Americans worked fewer hours than Europeans.  This finding is not
unique to the OECD data; it is found in other statistics as well.  Data
gathered by Maddison (1995) for instance, show a similar pattern in
hours worked per capita from 1950 to 1992.  In 1950, Americans
worked 24 percent fewer hours per capita than Germans, 18 percent
fewer per capita than the French, 15 percent fewer than the British, and
8 percent fewer than Italians.  By 1973 these differences narrowed
greatly, as Europeans took much of their increased prosperity in lei-
sure.  By 1992, Americans worked 6 percent more hours than Ger-
mans, 22 percent more than the French, and approximately 12 percent
more than the British or Italians.  Between 1950 and 1992, hours
worked per person in the United States was roughly constant, while
hours worked per person in Europe fell by 17 percent (Italy) to 33 per-
cent (France).  Data from Japan provided annually by the Japan Pro-
ductivity Center also show a drop in hours worked per employee of 4
percent from 1980 to 1991 compared to an increase in hours worked
per employee in the United States of 11 percent.  The Japan Institute of
Labor (1994–1995) reports a fall in hours actually worked, including
overtime, from 203 hours per month in 1960 to 159 per month in
1993—a 22 percent fall.  While most hours series still show that the
Japanese work more hours than Americans, the once-immense hours
gap has diminished greatly.  In Japan, the decline in hours is presum-
ably linked in part to changes in national legislation intended to reduce
hours to a 40-hour workweek by 1997 (OECD 1996), and for this rea-
son it will likely continue.
Evidence on the amount of overtime hours worked—for which
covered U.S. workers receive time-and-a-half overtime pay and for
which workers in other countries often receive less premium—also
shows a trend upward in U.S. overtime hours versus Germans and the
Japanese (Figure 2).  Whereas in 1994 overtime hours in the United
States were at a post–World War II peak, overtime hours in Germany
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were much below those in the early 1970s.  Overtime hours in Japan
were also considerably lower than in the 1970s, with the most signifi-
cant overtime hour declines in the last several years.  The OECD data
in Figure 2 show Americans with the highest amount of overtime of the
three countries.  While data from the Japanese Institute of Labor show
that Japanese workers still put in more overtime than Americans, it also
confirms that the difference in overtime hours has diminished greatly
with the trend downward in overtime hours in Japan.
The fact that North Americans worked more hours than western
Europeans in the 1990s and worked fewer hours than Europeans in the
1970s makes it difficult to explain cross-country differences in work
time in terms of diverse culture or national psychology.  The fact that
the increased preferences of North Americans for greater work relative
to Europeans seems to be a recent phenomenon (Bell and Freeman
1995) supports this as well.  Instead of focusing on cultural differences,
we direct our attention to differences and changes across countries in
the economic incentives that induce workers to work many hours.
Figure 2 Trends in Overtime Hours
SOURCE: OECD (1996, Table 3.7).
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Hours Worked and GDP Per Capita
How does working hard relate to national income per capita?
From a production function perspective, one might expect additional
employment per adult (more properly, employment per capita) to be
associated with higher GDP per capita—more input means more out-
put.  From a labor demand perspective, one might also expect a posi-
tive GDP per capita/labor input association: if higher GDP per capita
reflects higher capital per capita, this would produce greater demand
for labor and thus greater employment per capita.  But a labor supply
perspective suggests the opposite: falling time worked with higher
income due to the income effect.  Indeed, the labor supply–driven story
is the usual one given for the long-term downward trend in hours
worked, and would seem to fit the drop in hours in western Europe
post–World War II.
Figure 3 rejects the notion that either production/demand or supply
side forces dominate the relation between hours worked by employees
Figure 3 Annual Hours Worked per Employee vs. GDP Per Capita, 
by Country
SOURCE: Annual hours, OECD (1995, Table C).  GDP per capita from U.S. Bureau of
the Census, Statistical Abstract 1995, Table 1374.
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and income per capita (measured in purchasing power parity) among
countries.  There are high per capita income countries where employ-
ees put in lots of hours, such as the United States and Japan, and low
per capita income countries where employees also work many hours,
such as New Zealand.  While Canadians and Norwegians have similar
per capita incomes, they have very different annual hours worked, and
although Germans have a relatively high income per capita, they work
relatively few hours.  Indeed the message from Figure 3, if any, is that
an English heritage (save for Japan), not national income per capita,
determines worktime across countries.
The lack of any clear relation between hours worked and GDP per
capita notwithstanding, the wide variation in annual hours worked per
adult among advanced OECD countries (Table 1, column 2) suggests
that GDP per capita, unadjusted for differences in work time among
countries, may be a seriously misleading indicator of national produc-
tivity and well-being in cross-country comparisons.  On the productiv-
ity side, GDP per capita will understate the productivity of labor in
countries where adults work fewer hours and overstate it in countries
where adults work more hours.  GDP per working hour arguably offers
a better measure of productivity (Freeman 1995), although it is by no
means perfect.4  Measured by GDP per hour worked as opposed to
GDP per capita, the sizable lead that the United States has in national
productivity diminishes greatly.  In GDP per capita, for instance, in
1993 the United States had a 31 percent advantage over Germany.  In
GDP per hours worked, by contrast, the United States and Germany
had virtually identical productivity (Figure 4).  But since Americans
are working more hours than employees in these countries, we are
potentially further down the marginal product of labor curve and thus
are probably still more productive.  Without measures of capital and
other input, it is not possible to go much beyond the basic statement
that the United States isn’t as far ahead of others as initially appears to
be the case.
On the welfare side, fewer hours worked by the employed implies
greater leisure, which presumably adds to a worker’s utility.  Similarly,
persons who choose not to participate in the workplace produce valu-
able goods and services at home and/or enjoy greater leisure.  The non-
work hours of the unemployed, by contrast, is more difficult to assess:
with good benefit programs and high reservation wages, one cannot
81Figure 4 GDP Per Capita, GDP Per Hours, and GDP Adjusted for Leisure
SOURCE: Calculated as described in the text with hours per adult from Table 1; GDP per capita in purchasing power parity units from
the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1995, Table 1374); adults per capita from OECD, Historical Statistics (1992, Table 2.1).  Adjusted GDP
per capita assumes valuation of Leisure = GDP/Hours Worked in U.S.
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value unemployed hours at zero, but evidence that the unemployed are
less “happy” than others (Clark and Oswald 1994) clearly implies that
their time should be given a lower valuation than that of others.  In any
case, standard neoclassical analysis suggests that adults in countries
with fewer hours worked will be better off relative to those in countries
with more hours worked at the same level of GDP per capita.
In Figure 4, we pursue this logic by adjusting GDP per capita
(measured in purchasing power parity units) for differences in hours
worked per adult among countries.  We take U.S. GDP per capita and
hours worked per adult as the numeraire and estimate a leisure-aug-
mented GDP per capita for other countries (x), based on their hours
worked versus those in the United States using the following formula:
(Aug. gdp/cap)x = gdp/capx + (leisure hrsx(per adult)
– leisure hrsus(per adult) )
× (adults per capitax)(valuation of leisure)
The difficult component of the equation is the value attached to the
greater leisure of adults in other countries versus the United States.
One possible valuation is to set the value of leisure at GDP per hour
worked in a country, and in this case the equation simplifies nicely to:
(Aug. gdp/cap)x = gdp/capx [1 + (workhrsus – workhrsx)/workhrsx]
Another alternative is to value leisure in country x at GDP per hours
worked in the United States, giving us a more conservative estimate of
augmented GDP per capital, which takes U.S. work hours as the base.
This valuation simplifies to
(Aug. gdp/cap)x = gdp/capx  [1 + (workhrsus – workhrsx)/workhrsus]
In Figure 4 we report the results of the more conservative calculation.
We take GDP/capita in purchasing power parity units from the U.S.
Bureau of the Census (1995, Table 1374).  We estimate the additional
leisure that adults in country A have versus the United States by taking
the difference between hours worked per 15- to 64-year-old in the
United States and hours worked per 15- to 64-year-old in country X
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from Table 1 of this chapter.  We obtained values for adults/capita from
OECD Historical Statistics (1992), table 2.1.
Even with this conservative estimate of the value of leisure, our lei-
sure augmented GDP per capita substantially compresses the position
of the United States as the top country in the OECD league tables and
considerably lowers the standing of Japan.  More sophisticated analy-
sis, valuing the nonwork hours of different people differently, would
presumably produce somewhat different estimates but in the same
direction, reducing the position of the North American hard-working
countries.  Because we work so hard, standard GDP per capita country
comparisons indicate that we aren’t as well off as our European com-
patriots.
Factors in Employee Work Time
What factors underlie the gap in hours worked or its complement,
hours of leisure per employee, among advanced OECD countries?
The gap in hours worked and thus in hours of leisure per employee
between the United States/Canada and western Europe may be due to
the potential contribution of three factors, namely, differences in the
proportion of workers who are part-time, differences in weeks of vaca-
tion (and holiday to a much lesser extent) time, and differences in
hours worked per week by full-time workers.
Table 3 records the proportion of workers in various countries who
are part-time.  Even though European labor markets are less flexible
along some dimensions than North American labor markets, the pro-
portion of jobs held by part-timers is higher in many European coun-
tries than in the United States, although it is lower in both Germany
and France than in the United States.  Indeed, part-time working stands
out as the sole major form of nonstandard working that has shown a
substantial increase since 1970 in the majority of European OECD
countries (OECD 1996).
Given reasonable estimates of the difference in hours worked
between part-time and full-time workers, however, it is difficult to
explain much of the hours gap among employees between the United
States and other countries in terms of part-time work, even for the
European countries with very high part-time rates.  Consider, for exam-
ple, the case of the Netherlands, where 35 percent of workers are part-
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time.  The hours gap among employees in Table 1 between the United
States and the Netherlands is 485 hours.  Assume that the hours worked
by part-timers are 60 percent of those worked by full-timers.  Let dP be
the difference between the proportion of Dutch and American workers
who are part-time; according to Table 3, this is 16 percentage points
(35–19 percent).  Then, if the Dutch had the same proportion of part-
time workers as Americans, their average hours worked would increase
by 0.4/[1 – 0.4 (0.35)] dP, or by 7.4 percent.5   This would bring Dutch






















in work of 
part-timers
(hrs.)
United States 18.9 —a — — —
Canada 17.0 — — — —
Belgium 12.8 –7.5 –4.9 –2.5 0.2
Denmark 23.3 –6.6 1.4 –7.1 –0.9
Italy 6.2 –3.7 –0.9 –3.0 0.4
United
Kingdom 23.8 –1.5 –0.5 3.8 –0.5
Norway 26.5 — — — —
Sweden 24.9 — — — —
Germany 15.1 –10.9 –3.9 6–.1 –0.9
Finland 23.3 — — — —
France 14.9 –4.1 –4.4 0.4 0.7
Netherlands 35.0 –6.6 –11.3 0.0 3.2
Australia 24.4 — — — —
New Zealand 21.6 — — — —
Japan 21.4 — — — —
SOURCE: Column 1, OECD (1995, Table E; 1993 for Canada, the United Kingdom,
and Denmark; 1992 for Japan).  Columns 2–5, OECD (1996, Table 3.2).
a A dash implies that data for these countries were not provided in the OECD table.
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hours to 1,498, closing the hours gap by 103 hours, or 21 percent.  For
the other countries, the effect of increasing the part-time proportions to
U.S. levels would be markedly smaller, while for Germany and France,
the calculation works in the opposite direction: the low levels of part-
time work imply that the adjustment would increase the difference in
hours worked.  The vast bulk of the difference in annual hours worked
between North Americans and Europeans is evidently attributable to
differences in the hours of full-time workers.
While part-time work cannot explain much of the U.S.–Europe
hours gap, the increase in part-time work does help explain the 1980s–
1990s fall in hours worked among European countries.  Column 2 of
Table 3 records the overall average yearly change in annual hours
worked in European economies from 1983 to 1993 (with slight varia-
tion among countries due to differences in the data).  Columns 3–5
decompose that change into the part due to changes in the share of part-
timers in employment and in the hours worked of full-time and part-
time workers.  There is wide variation in the decomposition.  In France
all of the 1983–1993 drop in hours is due to an increased share of part-
timers.  In Germany, by contrast, the bulk of the decline in annual
hours is due to falling hours of full-time workers.  In the Netherlands,
the increase in part-timers “overexplains” the fall in hours; the com-
pensating factor is an increase in the hours of part-timers.  In the
United Kingdom, the hours worked by full-time employees works in
the opposite direction to the change in part-timers.  Additional data for
other European countries also show considerable variation in the
importance of part-time work to changes in annual hours.
If differences in the pattern of part-time work among countries do
not explain the bulk of the U.S.–European work hours differences,
what does?  Table 4 reverts back to this issue by considering the contri-
bution of differences in weekly hours and vacation/holiday time in
explaining the hours of full-time workers.  The data in Table 4 relate to
full-time employees in manufacturing because that is the only sector
for which we have readily available internationally comparable data.
However, scattered information for workers in other sectors (for
instance, from the Union Bank of Switzerland study of prices and earn-
ings around the globe) tells a similar story.  Indeed, because many
countries legislate vacation time or determine it through national col-
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lective bargaining, differences among sectors within a country tend to
be modest.
Column 1 of Table 4 gives the annual hours worked of full-time
manufacturing workers in the various countries.  Column 2 of the table
records the amount of vacation and holiday time in each country mea-
sured in five-day weeks.  Column 3 gives standard hours per working
week and is measured exclusive of overtime hours.  Note that there are
substantial differences in vacation and holiday time, due almost
entirely to vacations—in the United States the typical worker has a 2.4
week vacation compared to 5.1 weeks for the typical European.  Hours
worked per week differ much less, with Germany and Norway having
the lowest scheduled hours.
Column 4 calculates the difference in annual hours worked
between each of the countries and the United States.  The differences
are large: the 261-hour difference in annual hours of full-time workers
in manufacturing between the United States and Germany is 6.5 full
Table 4 The Contribution of Vacation/Holidays and Weekly Hours 

















United States 1,904 4.6 40.0
France 1,763 7.0 39.0 141 94 48
Germany 1,643 8.5 37.6 261 147 114
Italy 1,764 8.1 40.0 140 140 0
Netherlands 1,709 8.3 38.9 195 144 52
Norway 1,718 6.4 37.5 186 68 119
Sweden 1,784 7.6 40.0 120 120 0
United
Kingdom 1,769 6.6 38.8 135 78 57
Europe average 
(unweighted) 1,736 7.5 38.8 168 113 57
SOURCE: Tabulated from Bell and Freeman (1995, Table 5.2), using data from the
Federation of German Employer’s Association.
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weeks of work, and the 120-hour difference between the United States
and Sweden is 3 full weeks of work.  Column 5 gives our estimate of
the contribution of vacation and holiday time to the difference in
annual hours between the United States and other countries.  Column 6
gives our estimate of the contribution of hours worked per week to the
difference in annual hours between the United States and other coun-
tries.  In both of these calculations we take the United States as the
base and calculate the annual hours worked in other countries as if they
had U.S. vacation and holiday time, or as if they had U.S. weekly
hours.
The numbers in columns 5 and 6 show that much of the observed
difference in annual hours worked between the United States and other
countries is attributable to the low vacation and holiday time in the
United States.  With the sole exception of Norway, the annual hours
difference due to differences in vacation and holiday time are larger
than the differences due to hours worked.  In the case of Italy and Swe-
den, where scheduled hours are the same as in the United States, all of
the difference is due to vacation and holiday time.  In Germany and
Norway both vacation and holiday time and hours worked per week
contribute substantially to the annual hours gap with the United States.
For the other countries, the differences in vacation and holiday time
dominate the observed difference between U.S. annual hours and the
country’s annual hours.
The final line in Table 4 presents a crude summary of the factors
underlying country work hour differences.  It gives unweighted aver-
ages of annual hours, vacation and holiday time, and hours worked for
the European countries covered in the table.  It also shows the contribu-
tion of vacation and holiday time and hours worked to the difference
between the average annual hours and hours in the United States.
Approximately two-thirds of the gap between annual hours of full-time
workers is attributable to differences in vacations and holidays and
one-third to differences in hours per week.
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WHY WORK SO HARD?
Standard labor supply analyses link individual work hour decisions
to wages and nonlabor income.  In standard analysis, changes in mar-
ket wages have an ambiguous effect on work time or effort because
these changes have both an income and substitution effect typically
illustrated in textbooks with an indifference curve diagram.  Only in
the case of the pure substitution effect can responses to changes in
wages be signed, holding income/utility fixed, wage changes should
induce individuals to substitute hours in the same direction as the
change in wages.  Nonlabor income has an unambiguous effect on
work hours, with increases in income reducing time worked if leisure is
a normal good.  Changes in nonmarket productivity or wages will also
have an unambiguous effect on time worked in this model, since higher
nonmarket opportunities increase total income and induce substitution
of work time to nonmarket time.  Note that in standard labor supply
presentations, inequality of earnings opportunities does not enter the
supply decision in any obvious way.  Instead, the standard model
focuses on the effect of a change in individual wages without consider-
ing changes in the distribution of wage opportunities in the market.
In marked contrast, analyses of labor supply concerned with
designing contracts to motivate workers place great stress on the shape
of the opportunities frontier facing workers and thus on the distribution
of opportunities.  Piece rate or incentive pay schemes link rewards to
effort measured in terms of output.  Tournament pay systems link
rewards to relative effort.  In linking hours worked to the dispersion of
opportunities in the relevant market, our analysis of differences in
hours worked across countries or among persons in different markets
within a country builds on the insights from these types of models.
Consider, for example, two workers, each of whom faces a differ-
ently shaped earnings opportunities set due to differences in the distri-
bution of pay in the labor market, differences in job security
provisions, or differences in unemployment insurance or other safety
net provisions.  Hans works in Germany, where pay differences among
firms or within a firm among workers are relatively modest, where
there is considerable job security, and where unemployment benefits in
any event are high and relatively long-lived.  Hank works in the United
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States, where there are large pay differences among firms or within a
firm among workers, where employment at-will produces a high
degree of job insecurity, and where unemployment benefits are more
modest and relatively short-lived.  Who is more likely to work more
hours and put in more effort on his current job?  If Hans doesn’t work
that hard he doesn’t lose all that much, and if he works hard he doesn’t
gain all that much either.  But if Hank doesn’t work hard he can lose his
job and suffer painful unemployment or a sizable fall in pay at a new
job.  On the other hand, if he works hard, Hank can rise in the highly
unequal pay distribution and make much more money.
Expressed differently, if the percentile position of a worker in the
earnings distribution in his market (either through the firm that
employs him, promotions within that firm, or pay within a job grade in
that firm) depends on his hours worked/work effort, greater inequality
in pay will induce greater work effort.  For U.S.–Europe contrasts, our
hypothesis can be decomposed into three steps:
1) For an incremental hour of work/effort, employees improve them-
selves in the relevant earnings distribution commensurately in
terms of percentile position in the United States and Europe (if
U.S. workers’ earnings rise more,6 this simply augments our
story).
2) Any given change in the distribution of earnings translates into a
larger difference in earnings in distributions with greater disper-
sion of pay, and therefore American absolute earnings are more
dependent on percentile position than European absolute earn-
ings.
3) Individuals respond to differences in the return to hours/effort
with greater hours/effort.
Expressed somewhat differently, the hours-inequality argument is
that a mean-preserving spread of wages raises effort/hours.  The cor-
rect incentive variable in a labor supply equation is not the current
wage (as in many labor supply analyses), but the incremental change in
the lifetime-expected stream of income due to an increment in effort/
hours today—the derivative in lifetime income streams with respect to
an additional hour/effort at work.  Because we believe that this deriva-
tive is positively affected by pay inequality, we expect higher inequal-
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ity to be associated with greater hours/effort.  To the extent that the
level of the wage an individual receives affects the percentile position
and therefore the expected return to hours/effort, wage levels matter as
well.
Empirical Evidence
Is pay inequality, in fact, related to hours worked?
Bell and Freeman (1995) showed a positive rank correlation
between the variance of ln (earnings) and mean weekly hours among
full-time workers across nine countries in the 1989 ISSP survey, which
is suggestive of just such a relation.  Specifically, using data on earn-
ings and hours worked from nine countries including the United States,
Germany, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Ireland,
Northern Ireland, and Norway, the correlation analysis performed by
Bell and Freeman (1995) showed a strong association between the
hours-worked ranking of a country and the variation in ln earnings
ranking in that country, but no significant association between the
hours-worked ranking and the mean-earnings ranking, as might follow
from standard labor supply analysis.
Using data from the May 1985, 1989, and 1991 CPSs, we build on
evidence of within-cell variation among occupations, industries, and
regions in hours worked and test the role of wage variation in explain-
ing these hours patterns.
Specifically, we grouped workers into categories of noncompeting
markets by detailed industry, detailed occupation, detailed industry-
occupation, detailed industry-region, and detailed occupation-region as
defined within the CPS.  The rationale for this decomposition is to
arrive at labor market cells that reasonably contain the distribution of
wages relating to an individual worker’s future opportunities.  Exploit-
ing the fact of significant hours differences across cells, we attempt to
explore the role of differences in the derivative of lifetime opportuni-
ties with respect to hours/effort in explaining the hours patterns.
Absent such measures, we estimate the incentive for workers to put in
more hours/effort by the dispersion of pay in the job market in which
they work.
Throughout the bulk of our analysis, we concentrate on full-time,
private nonagricultural workers (working 35+ hours).7  Using the two-
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digit categorizations of industry and occupation in the CPS and limit-
ing the data to private nonagricultural workers gave us 42 potential
two-digit industries and 41 potential two-digit occupation cells to use
for our calculations.  The hours figures used in this analysis are  “usual
hours worked per week,” as reported in the CPS.  In calculating the
hourly earnings of nonhourly workers, we divided usual weekly earn-
ings by usual hours worked.  The hourly earnings of hourly workers are
self-reported in the CPS.
For each detailed industry and/or occupation-region cell, we calcu-
lated four statistics:
1) the mean hours worked in the relevant cell,
2) the mean ln (hourly earnings),
3) the standard deviation in ln (hourly earnings), and
4) the 90/10 percentile ln earnings spread of full-time workers.
Appendix Table A1 shows the calculated statistics of mean hours, pay,
and inequality in pay by industry for each year.  Appendix Table A2
shows the resultant estimates by occupation for each year.  We note siz-
able variation in mean hours worked across both industry and occupa-
tion in these tables.
Table 5 summarizes the basic relationship in these data in terms of
the correlation coefficients between hours worked and the level and
dispersion of pay across the relevant cells.  In each of the three years
analyzed, we obtain a positive and in most cases significant correlation
between hours worked and the dispersion in hourly earnings, measured
by either the standard deviation or the 90/10 percentile spread in ln
(hourly wages).  The strong positive relationship between hours
worked and wage variability is more robust than the cross-section rela-
tion between hours worked and the level of pay—work hours are
higher in higher paid occupations but lower in higher paid industries in
two of the three years.
How robust is the empirical relation between inequality of pay and
time worked?  As shown in Table 5, changes in the measure of inequal-
ity of pay do not noticeably affect the relationship nor do changes in
the cell categories.8  However, in order to provide a further check on
the basic relationship, we regressed hours worked by an individual in
92 Bell and Freeman
Table 5 The Correlation between Hours Worked and the Level 
of Variance of Wages, by Detailed Industry, Occupation, 
and Region Cells as Indicateda
Cell category
Mean ln (hourly 
earnings)
Std. ln (hourly 
earnings) 90–10 spread
May 1985 CPS Data
Detailed industry n=41 –0.220 0.200 0.111





n=160 –0.249** 0.096 0.166**
Detailed occupation—region 
n=161 0.179** 0.328** 0.346**
May 1989 CPS Data































a For private nonagricultural workers, 35+ hours.
b  ** Indicates statistical significance at greater than 0.05% level.
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the 1991 May CPS sample on a set of measures of personal characteris-
tics, family income, and the wage, together with our measures of mar-
ket inequality: the standard deviation of ln (hourly earnings) in an
occupation-industry cell; the standard deviation of ln (hourly earnings)
in an occupation cell; and the standard deviation of ln (hourly earnings)
in an industry cell.  Table 6 records the results of these calculations.
The results are clear: all of the measures of inequality are estimated to
have a positive effect on hours worked.  Since (as is common in cross-
section calculations like these) family income obtains a positive coeffi-
cient while the hourly wage has a negative coefficient in the hours
regression, we would not interpret the equation as a labor supply rela-
tion, but rather as a check on the robustness of the inequality-time
worked correlation that we argue is a more appropriate measure of the
incentive to work hard than standard wage measures.
While we regard the results from Table 5 and 6 as supportive of the
hours-inequality hypothesis, we note that this result is sensitive to one
change in specification, namely, the inclusion of part-time workers in
the sample.  With part-timers included, the significant positive correla-
tion between inequality of pay and hours worked disappears.  Among
industries, the correlation became negative in two of our three years
whereas among occupations it remains positive but insignificant.  One
reason for this pattern is that there is considerable measurement error
in the pay and possibly hours of part-timers that produces a large stan-
dard deviation in pay.  Part-time work is associated with spurious ine-
quality in pay, and, by definition, with fewer hours worked in a cell.
This will bias the correlation of inequality to hours downward.  Appen-
dix Table A3 shows, however, that even with this bias, excluding part-
timers who report working less than 10 hours per week, we obtain
regression results with part-timers that are weaker than those in Table 6
but still support the basic hours-inequality hypothesis.
The hours-inequality hypothesis would, of course, be strengthened
by evidence from other countries that workers respond to the incentives
brought about by greater pay inequality by changing their actual work
hours, as well as evidence that pay inequality affects desired work
hours.  While we lack detailed household data from other countries, the
1989 ISSP data allow us to evaluate worker preferences across coun-
tries.  Ideally, we would want to analyze individual responses to two
types of questions: how important individuals believed hours/effort to
94Table 6 Hours Regressions, May 1991 CPSa
Dependent variable: ln (usual hours worked per week)
Independent variables
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Region dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Industryd dummy No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Occupationd dummy No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No No No
R2 0.0287 0.139 0.110 0.150 0.151 0.147 0.050 0.103 0.125 0.122
N 8,615 8,615 8,615 8,615 8,820 9,926 8,820 8,820 8,820 9,445
a For private, nonagricultural workers, 35+ hours. Standard errors are in parentheses.
b Standard deviation in ln (hourly wage) in detailed industry/occupation cell.
c Standard deviation in ln (hourly wage) in detailed occupation cell.
d Detailed occupation and industry dummy variables.
96 Bell and Freeman
be in determining pay/promotion/status within their work, and an indi-
vidual’s current hours and desired hours of work.
The 1989 ISSP data offer some valuable insight in this regard.
Workers were asked to comment on “how important the quality of their
work” was in determining their pay.  An individual had the choice to
respond in one of three ways: very important, somewhat important, or
not very important.  To the extent that the quality of an individual’s
work reflects work effort or hours, as it reasonably might, our theory
would predict that individuals who respond that quality is extremely
important would work more hours.  As Figure 5A makes clear, we find
precisely this relationship in the data for all countries.  Figure 5B
cross-tabulates responses to this question and to the question on how
hard an individual works.  Note that individuals who believe quality is
extremely important in determining pay are more likely to “work hard
even if it interferes with the rest of their lives” than are workers who
believe quality to be relatively unimportant.  Once again, with the
exception of Austria, these results are uniformly true among countries
in the sample.  In sum, evidence from the ISSP offers additional sup-
port to the hours-inequality hypothesis with respect both to actual and
desired hours of work, and suggests that workers in other countries
respond similarly to workers in the United States in their hours prefer-
ences.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has documented the fact that Americans, and to a
lesser extent Canadians, work hard, putting in more hours—and want-
ing to put in even more—than employees in many other advanced
countries.  It has shown that taking account of differences in the
amount of time worked across countries alters the position of the
United States in standard comparisons of GDP per capita.  It has pre-
sented calculations of the relationship between inequality of pay and
hours worked within U.S. occupation and industry job markets that
suggest inequality of pay contributes to hours worked.  In sum, in the
United States we work hard because we face a good “carrot” for put-
ting out time and effort, and because we also face a substantial “stick”
if we do not.
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Figure 5A Average Weekly Hours and Feelings about Importance of 
Work Quality for Pay
Figure 5B Workaholicsa and Feelings about Importance of Work Quality 
for Pay
SOURCE: ISSP 1989.
a Workers who work hard even if it interferes with the rest of their lives.
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 Notes
1. The ISSP is a program of cross-national collaboration carried out with research
institutes that conduct annual surveys of social attitudes and values.  The virtue of
the survey is that it seeks to ask similar questions in identical form in the partici-
pating nations.
2. In the ISSP there is a question about preferred hours of work that asks: Think of
the number of hours you work and the money you earn on your main job, includ-
ing overtime.  Bell and Freeman (1995) analyze the responses to this question.  It
shows that Americans are more likely to want more hours and more pay than
Europeans, but by much smaller amounts than are shown by questions that
exclude overtime.  The European Economic Community has asked workers about
their preferences between increases in pay (for all hours of work) and reductions
in hours worked that would maintain their real income in a collective bargaining
session.  The responses show that people prefer increases in pay, consistent with
the hypothesis that most workers are in equilibrium in their choices about current
hours of work.
3. Preferences for hours worked appears to be very closely linked to age in Japan,
according to various work hour surveys (see Public Opinion Survey on Working
Hours and Five-Day Workweek, for example), with younger Japanese dispropor-
tionately predisposed to shorter working hours than their more senior colleagues.
4. The problem is that with the same capital stock, fewer hours worked (due, say, to
unemployment) implies higher labor productivity.  Thus, Spain will have a rela-
tively high productivity when employment falls—hardly an indicator of a good
economic performance.  All partial economic indicators are potentially misleading.
5. Let H = annual hours; F = hours of full-time workers; and p = proportion of work-
ers who are part-time in the given country.  Assume part-timers work 0.6F hours.
Then H = (1 – p)F + 0.6pF = (1 – 0.4p)F.  A change in p thus changes H by
0.4Fdp.  Dividing by H to get percentage changes in annual hours, we get DH/H =
0.4/(1 – 0.4p)dp.
6. Data from the 1989 ISSP suggest that at least with respect to perceptions, this
may be true.  U.S. workers (87 percent) are far more likely to indicate that “the
quality of their work is important in determining their pay” than are German
workers (47 percent).
7. There are two compelling reasons for concentrating our empirical analysis on
full-time private nonagricultural workers.  First, the theory that we build on to
explain the wage-inequality link is based on a significant amount of future job
attachment that is less likely to be an important component of the marginal deci-
sions of part-time workers.  Second, measurement error problems are likely to be
exacerbated among workers reporting very low numbers of usual weekly hours.
8. Small numbers of observations in individual cells imply that estimates are sensitive
to extreme values of hours or wages (either true or measured with error).  Correla-
tion estimates by major industry-occupation cells produced a qualitatively similar,
although less strong relationship between hours worked and wage variation.
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Std. dev. ln 
(hourly
wage)
Mining 47.1 0.217 13.87 0.526
Transportation 45.1 0.180 10.71 0.484
Private household services 44.8 0.245 3.56 0.596
Petroleum and coal 44.6 0.134 12.64 0.300
Wholesale trade 44.1 0.140 11.10 0.487
Other professional services 43.8 0.170 12.75 0.623
Non-electrical machinery 43.5 0.122 12.71 0.467
Rubber and plastics 43.2 0.130 9.47 0.439
Repair service 43.2 0.140 8.75 0.436
Tobacco manufacturers 43.0 0.166 16.80 0.593
Motor vehicles and equipment 42.8 0.120 12.86 0.434
Food and kindred products 42.6 0.130 9.26 0.480
Business services 42.6 0.133 10.85 0.574
Stone, clay, and glass 42.6 0.097 11.40 0.410
Insurance and real estate 42.5 0.136 11.19 0.510
Fabricated metal 42.5 0.104 10.76 0.420
Chemicals and allied products 42.5 0.110 15.32 0.491
Education services 42.4 0.143 10.51 0.541
Electrical machinery 42.4 0.111 12.85 0.513
Retail trade 42.3 0.136 7.73 0.504
Leather and leather products 42.3 0.112 8.62 0.539
Entertainment and rec. services 42.3 0.136 8.61 0.518
Toys, amusements, and sporting 42.3 0.133 8.41 0.531
Aircraft and parts 42.3 0.104 12.97 0.458
Other transportation equipment 42.3 0.106 13.75 0.382
Primary metals 42.2 0.111 11.52 0.404
Utilities 42.2 0.113 14.00 0.425
Textile mill products 42.2 0.106 8.11 0.436
Construction 42.2 0.117 11.45 0.471
Paper and allied products 42.1 0.097 10.81 0.414









Std. dev. ln 
(hourly
wage)
Professional and photo 
equipment 41.9 0.098 11.60 0.479
Lumber and wood, except 
furniture 41.9 0.096 8.40 0.339
Social services 41.8 0.150 8.41 0.555
Personal services excluding 
household 41.6 0.128 6.86 0.461
Printing and publishing 41.6 0.107 10.54 0.481
Hospitals 41.6 0.115 10.91 0.434
Banking and other finance 41.6 0.108 11.70 0.501
Furniture and fixtures 41.3 0.070 8.50 0.346
Miscellaneous manufacturing 41.2 0.078 7.92 0.509
Health services excluding 
hospitals 41.1 0.118 9.00 0.459
Apparel 40.2 0.057 6.56 0.448
a Full-time workers are defined to be workers with usual weekly hours ≥ 35.
b Usual weekly hours at main job.
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Table A2 Mean Weekly Hours and Wages in Nonagricultural Detailed 








Std. dev. ln 
(hourly
wage)
Health diagnosis 57.0 0.197 16.79 0.527
Lawyers and judges 46.7 0.157 22.39 0.473
Motor vehicle operators 46.5 0.189 8.83 0.410
Supervisors, proprietors, and 
sales 46.3 0.165 11.25 0.507
Executives, administrators, and 
managers 45.2 0.154 14.73 0.546
Teachers, college 44.9 0.178 17.68 0.523
Other professional specialties 44.3 0.187 12.07 0.582
Sales reps, finance, and business 
services 44.2 0.148 12.36 0.562
Sales reps, commodities, 
excluding retail 44.1 0.133 13.79 0.516
Natural scientists 44.0 0.130 15.20 0.529
Private household services 43.8 0.211 3.25 0.586
Other transportation and 
material moving 43.8 0.166 10.51 0.431
Engineers 43.3 0.122 19.28 0.325
Mechanics and repairers 43.1 0.129 11.08 0.405
Construction laborers 43.1 0.134 8.81 0.445
Other precision production 43.0 0.129 11.41 0.455
Teachers, except college 43.0 0.144 8.94 0.570
Mathematical and computer 
scientists 43.0 0.117 17.74 0.372
Management 42.7 0.113 14.44 0.449
Supervisors–administrative
support 42.5 0.122 11.63 0.432
Engineering and science 
technicians 42.1 0.100 12.62 0.415









Std. dev. ln 
(hourly
wage)
Fabricators, inspectors, and 
samplers 41.8 0.110 9.49 0.424
Construction trades 41.7 0.114 11.61 0.450
Handlers, equip. cleaners, 
laborers 41.7 0.114 7.38 0.432
Health assessment and treating 41.5 0.117 13.16 0.356
Machine operators, excluding 
precision 41.3 0.092 8.13 0.423
Food service 41.3 0.148 5.31 0.426
Personal services 41.2 0.118 7.18 0.467
Personal service occupations 41.1 0.118 6.49 0.518
Protective services 41.1 0.093 6.48 0.391
Sales related 41.0 0.034 11.19 0.151
Health technologists and 
technicians 40.9 0.093 10.14 0.329
Freight, stock, and material 
handlers 40.7 0.092 7.03 0.381
Health service 40.6 0.123 6.71 0.366
Computer equipment operators 40.6 0.075 9.33 0.420
Financial records, processing 40.4 0.070 7.96 0.318
Main and message distributing 40.4 0.041 7.87 0.430
Other administrative support, 
clerical 40.4 0.075 8.63 0.395
Cleaning and building services 40.3 0.078 6.46 0.346
Secretaries, stenographers, and 
typists 40.0 0.058 8.36 0.355
SOURCE: May 1989 CPS.
a Full-time workers are defined to be workers with usual weekly hours ≥ 35.
b Usual weekly hours at main job.
104Table A3 Hours Regressionsa
Dependent variables: ln (usual hours worked per week)
Independent variables



































Std. dev. of ln (hourly wage)c
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Region dummy No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Industryd dummy No No Yes No No Yes
Occupationd dummy No No No Yes No No
R2 0.088 0.152 0.217 0.217 0.098 0.181
N 10,344 10,344 10,344 10,344 10,344 10,540
a For private, nonagricultural workers, including part-time workers, standard errors are in parentheses.
b Standard deviation in ln (hourly wage) in detailed industry/detailed occupation cell.
c Standard deviation in ln (hourly wage) in detailed occupation cell.
d Detailed occupation and industry dummy variables.









Patterns, Trends, and the 
Policy Implications














W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007–4686
The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are
the sole responsibility of the authors.  They do not necessarily represent positions of
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Cover design by J.R. Underhill.
Index prepared by Nancy Humphreys.
Printed in the United States of America.
